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Abstract 
The analysis in this paper provides estimates of family welfare losses generated by wage and 
non-labor income declines experienced across the Great Recession and by labor market 
constraints existing post-recession.  Welfare losses are greater as families (both married and 
single) move up the income distribution.  Total static welfare losses are estimated to amount to 
roughly $190 billion, comparing family welfare between 2007 and 2011. 
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Family Welfare and the Great Recession 
 
I. Introduction and Background 
 Analyses of the impact of the Great Recession on families have taken many forms.  
Morgan et al. (2012) find little evidence that the Great Recession affected fertility rates, 
cohabitation, or divorce, although they do find an increase in the proportion of young adults 
living with their parents.  A more dramatic assessment can be found in Warner (2010: 2): 
"The poor are getting poorer, and the rich, despite stock-market setbacks, are 
still comparatively rich. The most devastating losses in household wealth 
over the past two years have been suffered by the middle class. And families 
are fraying at the seams." 
 
There is no question that economic statistics, such as net family wealth (Lerman 2012), foregone 
consumption (Lansing 2011), underemployment (Sum and Khatiwada 2010), and long-term 
unemployment (Kroft, et al 2013) paint of picture of families worse off after the recession than 
before.  The purpose of this paper is to quantify the overall welfare impact of the Great 
Recession experienced by families across the income distribution.  A particular focus will be on 
the implications for welfare of the decline on real wages and non-labor income, and the 
constrained optimization implied by the notion of underemployment.   
 The microsimulation methodology employed by Hotchkiss, Moore, and Rios-Avila 
(2012) will be used to estimate parameters of a joint labor supply model within the context of a 
family utility framework for couple households, while a similar extension will be applied to 
single headed households.1  For the purposes of the question posed here, the estimated 
parameters from the family utility model will be used to simulate the impact on family welfare of 
varying labor market conditions.   The goal of the static analysis in this paper will be to provide a 
                                                
1 Microsimulation is a popular methodology for assessing the impact of tax policy changes (for 
example, see Fiorio 2008, Blundell et al. 2000, Bahl et al. 1993, and Blundell 1992). 
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quantitative value of welfare against which to compare the cost of policies under consideration to 
alleviate suboptimal labor market outcomes.  In this paper, a family's welfare is measured 
directly as the dollar equivalent utility the family experiences under alternative labor market 
scenarios.  This paper does not to derive an optimal policy that would return families to their pre-
recession, or even unconstrained post-recession, utility levels, but, rather, the goal of this 
analysis is to quantify the welfare loss incurred by different types of families along the income 
distribution across the Great Recession. 
 
II. Methodology 
 A. Family Utility Framework 
 Family labor supply decisions are modeled here in a neoclassical joint utility framework.  
This model can be thought of as a reduced-form specification of family decision making.  The 
model yields a clear-cut expression of family welfare that allows for cross wage effects on each 
member's labor supply decision.  The assumption of joint family utility (or, "collective" utility) is 
often rejected in favor of a bargaining structure to household decisions making (for example, see 
Apps and Rees, 2009, McElroy, 1990).  However there is evidence that the choice of structure 
for household decision making has very little implication for conclusions in microsimulation 
exercises (see Bargain and Moreau, 2003).  In addition, Blundell et al. (2007) find that both 
collective and bargaining models are consistent with their household labor supply model 
estimated in the U.K.   The joint utility framework is used here in order to evaluate welfare 
changes of the family (as opposed to evaluating the utility of individuals). 
 Within the framework of the neoclassical family labor supply model, a family maximizes 
a utility function that represents the household welfare.  Assuming, for simplicity, that there are 
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only two working members of the household (husband and wife), the family chooses levels of 
leisure for each member and a joint consumption level in order to solve the following problem:2 max!!,!!,! 𝑈 = 𝑈 𝐿!, 𝐿!,𝐶    𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡𝑜  𝐶 = 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑌 . (1) 
 
Define T as total time available for an individual; 𝐿! = 𝑇 − ℎ! will be referred to as the 
husband's leisure, and 𝐿! = 𝑇 − ℎ! will be referred to as the wife's leisure; ℎ! is the labor supply 
of the husband; ℎ! is the labor supply of the wife; C is total money income (or consumption with 
price equal to one); 𝑤! is the husband's after-tax market wage; 𝑤! is the wife's market wage; and 
Y is non-labor income.  Although we refer to 𝐿! and 𝐿! as the "leisure" of the husband and wife, 
respectively, they actually correspond to all uses of non-market time, including home production 
activities.3   
 The solution to the maximization problem in equation (1) can be expressed in terms of 
the indirect utility function, which is solely a function of the wages of the husband and wife and 
non-labor income of the family: 𝑉 𝑤!,𝑤!,𝑌 = 𝑈 𝑇 − ℎ!∗ 𝑤!,𝑤!,𝑌 , 𝑇 − ℎ!∗ 𝑤!,𝑤!,𝑌 ,                                                                       𝑤!ℎ!∗ 𝑤!,𝑤!,𝑌 + 𝑤!ℎ!∗ 𝑤!,𝑤!,𝑌 + 𝑌  , (2) 
where ℎ!∗ 𝑤!,𝑤!,𝑌  and ℎ!∗ 𝑤!,𝑤!,𝑌  correspond to the optimal labor supply equations (desired 
hours) for the husband and wife, respectively.  By totally differentiating the indirect utility 
function, we can simulate the change in welfare that derives from changes in optimal hours of 
                                                
2 This strategy is adapted to expand the analysis and include single headed households. 
Empirically, this implies setting hours and wages of the second member equal to zero, as well as 
constraining all utility parameters concerning the second member to be zero.  In addition, sample 
construction excludes families with unmarried, same- or opposite-sex adults/partners.  There are 
not enough occurances to produce reliable utility function parameters for this family type. 
3 Apps and Rees (2009) are highly critical of family utility models that do not include measures 
of household production, but even they acknowledge that not much can be done without the 
availability of richer data (p. 108).  Since the focus of the analysis in this paper is utility at the 
household level, the absence of home production activities is not crucial. 
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work and consumption in response to changes in wages and non-labor income (also see Apps 
and Rees, 2009: 263): 𝑑𝑉 = −𝑈!𝑑ℎ!∗ − 𝑈!𝑑ℎ!∗ + 𝑈!𝑑𝐶∗ , (3) 
where 𝑈! is the family's marginal utility of the husband's leisure, 𝑈! is the family's marginal 
utility of the wife's leisure, and 𝑈! is the family's marginal utility of consumption.  Equation (3) 
makes it clear that the change in welfare not only depends on the individual labor supply 
responses, but also on the family's marginal evaluation of a change in leisure and home income. 
 B. Simulating the Welfare Impact of Suboptimal Outcomes 
 When assessing welfare at suboptimal outcomes, we can no longer use the indirect utility 
function, but, rather, must use the direct utility function to calculate changes in welfare, based on 
the actual (rather than optimal) labor supply changes.4 One statistic often pointed to in support of 
the contention of suboptimal outcomes during the Great Recession is the stubbornly elevated 
share of the workforce that is part-time for economic reasons (i.e., have a part-time job, but 
would like to work full-time).  We would consider these individuals to be underemployed from a 
utility maximizing perspective.   
 Generally, we will identify someone as underemployed in this analysis if the person is 
observed working fewer hours post-recession than his/her predicted optimum, based on pre-
recession preferences and post-recession wages and non-labor income.  Figure 1 provides a 
simple illustration for an individual of the type of comparison that will be possible from the 
empirical analysis.  The indifference curve 𝑈!""#∗  corresponds to this person's pre-recession 
optimum level of hours of work/leisure and consumption.  Post-recession, if real wages and non-
labor income are lower, this person would be forced to a new optimum, 𝑈!"##∗ , at fewer hours of 
                                                
4 In other words, 𝑑𝑈(𝐿!, 𝐿!,𝐶) = 𝑈!𝑑𝐿! + 𝑈!𝑑𝐿! + 𝑈!𝑑𝐶∗ = −𝑈!𝑑ℎ! − 𝑈!𝑑ℎ! + 𝑈!𝑑𝐶.  See 
Appendix A for details. 
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work and lower consumption.  If this person is further constrained in hours of work (e.g., part-
time for economic reasons, or, in the extreme, unemployed), he/she ends up on the indifference 
curve 𝑈!"##, at even fewer hours of work and lower consumption. 
[Figure 1 here] 
  
 When labor markets are tight, we assume that individuals are able to choose their optimal 
hours of work without constraint.  Or, at least there are enough wage/hours combinations of job 
offers that one can get close to their optimum hours for a given wage.  In a weak labor market, 
the number of wage/hours combinations is likely significantly reduced, constraining the hours 
options available at a given wage.  The welfare impact of this scenario is illustrated in Figure 1 
as a movement from 𝑈!"##∗  (unconstrained hours optimization) to 𝑈!"#!(with constrained hours).  
Empirically, in the framework of the proposed methodology, the family welfare changes 
described above can be calculated as:5   𝑈!"##∗ − 𝑈!""#∗ = −𝑈!𝑑ℎ!∗ − 𝑈!𝑑ℎ!∗ +   𝑈!𝑑𝐶∗ (4) 
and 𝑈!"## − 𝑈!"##∗ = −𝑈!𝑑ℎ! − 𝑈!𝑑ℎ! +   𝑈!×𝑑𝐶 (5) 
Details of these calculations are found in Appendix A.  Note that the change in hours (𝑑ℎ!∗  and 𝑑ℎ!) take into account changes on the extensive and intensive margin of the hours worked, 
averaged across the population. 
 The actual impact on utility will depend on the relative value a family places on leisure 
and income.  At low values of marginal utility of income or low wages, it is possible for utility to 
increase for a small decrease in hours of work.  However, as hours of work decline further, the 
marginal utility of leisure gained declines while the marginal utility of income losses increases, 
                                                
5 Since utility is decreasing in hours of work, hours enter negatively on the right hand side of the 
equation.  
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possibly reducing overall family welfare. This makes the relationship between hours of work and 
family welfare nonlinear.  The dollar value of this change in family welfare is obtained by 
simply dividing the change in utility by the marginal utility of income (𝑈!). 
 Utility function parameters are estimated separately for married and single families at 
different points on the income distribution, allowing preferences regarding trade-offs between 
leisure and consumption to vary by family income level, besides other correlating 
characteristics.6  
 C. Estimation Issues 
 Calculation of the average post-recession optimal labor supply (ℎ!"##∗  in Figure 1) 
depends on the estimation of labor supply elasticities of the husband and wife with respect to 
changes in their own and each other's wages, elasticities with respect to non-labor family 
income, as well as the changes in the probability of employment (extensive margin elasticities) 
(i.e., the probability of being at an interior solution on the budget constraint).  There are many 
divergent empirical issues raised in the literature in relation to estimating labor supply responses 
to wage changes, i.e., estimates of labor supply elasticities.  While the focus of this paper is on 
the simulation exercise itself, the simulation does require labor supply elasticities and it is 
therefore worthwhile to address some of the empirical issues.  The goal here is to produce 
reasonable labor supply elasticities that are consistent with the literature.  Toward that end, the 
methodology adopted takes the simplest approach possible while maintaining basic theoretical 
and empirical integrity. 
 The requirement of simplicity here primarily derives from the goal of quantifying the 
family-level utility changes.  In order to obtain estimates of the pieces of the change in utility in 
                                                
6 As shown in Hotchkiss, et al (2012), wage elasticities and marginal utilities vary considerably 
across household income. 
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equation (4) a specific functional form of utility must be specified.   Following others (e.g., 
Hotchkiss et al. 2012, Heim, 2009, Hotchkiss et al., 1997, and Ransom, 1987), we estimate a 
quadratic form of the utility function:7     𝑈 𝑍 = 𝛼 𝑍 − (1 2)𝑍!Β𝑍 , (6) 
where Z is a vector with elements 𝑍! = 𝑇 − ℎ!, 𝑍! = 𝑇 − ℎ!, and 𝑍! = 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑌;  is 
a vector of parameters and Β is a symmetric matrix of parameters.  This functional form has the 
advantage of belonging to the class of flexible functional forms in the sense that it can be thought 
of as a second order approximation to an arbitrary utility function (when Β is positive definite).  
In addition, it is possible to produce analytical closed-form solutions for both the husband's and 
wife's labor supply functions. Obtaining the first order conditions of this unconstrained 
maximization problem results in a system of equations linear in ℎ:8 
!!!ℎ! = Ω!ℎ! + Ω!ℎ! + Ω!=0 (7) !!!ℎ! = Ω!ℎ! + Ω!ℎ! + Ω!=0 (8) 
This system can be solved simultaneously, and the desired hours become ℎ!∗ = 𝑓 𝑤!,𝑤!,𝑌  and ℎ!∗ = 𝑔 𝑤!,𝑤!,𝑌 , which represent the desired number of hours the members of a household 
would like to work, given the parameters that define their household utility function, given 
wages and non-labor income.   
 Observed hours (ℎ), however, might differ from the optimum hours due to stochastic 
errors, such that: ℎ! = ℎ!∗ + 𝑒!          𝑖𝑓  ℎ!∗ + 𝑒! > 00                                  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒    
                                                
7 Details on the extension of this model to single households are presented in Appendix B.  
8 The components of and solution for desired hours are found in Appendix B. 
α
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ℎ! = ℎ!∗ + 𝑒!          𝑖𝑓  ℎ!∗ + 𝑒! > 00                                  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  ,       (9) 
where we assume that 𝑒!, 𝑒!  follows a bivariate Normal distribution with mean 0 and 
covariance matrix ∑ .  This model can be thought of as a simultaneous Tobit model, where we 
have four kinds of families: those where both husband and wife work, those where only one of 
the spouses works (2 cases), and those where neither of them work.  Allowing for hours 
adjustment along the extensive margin for the wife when assessing labor supply responses to 
wage changes have been found to make a significant difference when assessing total labor supply 
response (for example, see Heim, 2009 and Eissa et al., 2004), however, extensive margin hours 
adjustments appear to be unimportant for men (for example, see Heim, 2009, Blundell et al., 
1988).  Considering the simulation of suboptimal labor market outcomes that we plan to conduct 
allowing for non-working husbands may be important, so we opt to include them in the analysis. 
 The presence of non-working wives and husbands raises one empirical issue identified by 
Keane (2010) that must be addressed: market wages are not observed for family members who 
do not work.  To obtain estimates of those wages, we take the standard approach in the literature 
of estimating a selectivity-corrected wage equation (Heckman, 1974) on the sample of working 
men and women, using regressors observable for both working and nonworking individuals.9  
The resulting parameter estimates are then used to predict wages for nonworking men and 
women based on their observable characteristics.   
 The maximum likelihood function corresponding to the joint labor supply optimization 
problem can be written as follows: 
                                                
9 For purposes of identification, the Heckman selection equation uses non-labor income,  number 
of children in the household, and spouse education (for married households) as exclusion 
restriction variables. 
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𝐿 = 1𝜎!𝜎! 𝜓 ℎ! − ℎ!∗𝜎!    , ℎ! − ℎ!∗𝜎! ,𝜌 !!!,!!!!!!!  
∗ 1𝜎! 𝜑 ℎ! − ℎ!∗𝜎! 1−Φ 𝜎!ℎ!∗ − 𝜌𝜎! ℎ! − ℎ!∗𝜎!𝜎! 1− 𝜌! !!!,!!!  
∗ 1𝜎! 𝜑 ℎ! − ℎ!∗𝜎! 1−Φ 𝜎!ℎ!∗ − 𝜌𝜎! ℎ! − ℎ!∗𝜎!𝜎! 1− 𝜌! !!!,!!!  
∗Ψ   !!!∗!!    ,   !!!∗!! ,𝜌 !!!,!!!      (10) 
Where 𝜑 and Φ correspond to the probability density and cumulative distribution functions of a 
univariate normal, and 𝜓 and Ψ represent the probability density and cumulative distribution 
functions of the bivariate normal. Also, H=1 if the husband is working and W=1 if the wife is 
working (0 otherwise), 𝜎! (i=1,2) represents the standard deviations of 𝑒!, 𝑒!  and 𝜌 is the 
correlation between the stochastic errors. 
 The stochastic errors accounted for in equation (9) represent errors in optimization -- 
observed hours do not exactly reflect desired hours.10  Keane (2010) points out that there may 
exist measurement error in observed wages and non-labor income.  This classical measurement 
error may bias elasticity estimates toward zero.  Heim (2009), using a methodology most similar 
to the one used here, presents results showing that accounting for measurement error produces 
elasticities practically identical to when it is not accounted for. A typical strategy to mitigate the 
introduction of measurement error on wages per hour has been to restrict the sample to hourly 
paid workers.  Unfortunately, we cannot restrict the sample to workers paid weekly or hourly, 
since the American Community Survey (ACS) does not provide information on hourly or weekly 
wages. Instead, we construct the person's hourly wage using information about weeks worked 
                                                
10 These errors, however, are not expected to reflect suboptimal outcomes that might be observed 
because of labor market constraints (as we might expect exist post-recession). 
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per year and usual hours worked per week.  This means our wage estimate might suffer from 
what Keane refers to as "denominator bias," which will have the tendency of biasing labor 
supply elasticities downward. 
 Keane (2010) also identifies two potential sources of endogeneity.  First, it is reasonable 
to expect that observed wages and non-labor income are correlated with a person's taste for work 
(reflected through hours of work).  Both fixed effects and instrumental variables have been used 
to resolve this issue, but are simply not possible in this case since we do not have panel data and 
because of the highly non-linear nature of the labor supply functions.  In addition to the inclusion 
of variables expected to affect the taste for work (e.g., children), we expect that the inclusion of 
spousal variables (through the estimation of joint labor supply) will help to remove additional 
sources of correlation from the error term (i.e., because of positive assortative mating, people 
with similar taste for work will be married to each other; see Lam, 1988, Hernstein and Murray, 
1994).  In addition, we abstract from the progressivity of the tax structure by using gross wages 
and estimating utility function parameters separately for families at different points in the income 
distribution.  This amounts to "linearizing" the budget constraint (see Hall 1970), which is valid 
if preferences are strictly convex.11  This means that family members would make the same 
hours choice facing this linearized budget constraint that they would have made facing the 
nonlinear budget constraint.  If this assumption is binding, Keane points out that labor supply 
elasticities will be biased in a negative direction. 
 An additional concern Keane (2010) identifies in the literature is making sure the 
hours/wage combinations observed in the data are coming off workers' labor supply curve, rather 
                                                
11 This assumption of strictly convex preferences is supported by a positive definite B matrix. As 
it will be seen, all the eigenvalues of the estimated B matrices are positive, indicating the matrix 
itself is positive definite. 
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than off employers' labor demand curve.  Identification of the labor supply relationship boils 
down to including regressors (determinants of hours) that reflect the demand for a person's skills 
(thus determine the observed wage) that are not reflective of that person's taste for work.  
Toward that end, we include an indicator for race that could affect observed wage through 
employer discrimination, but, ceteris paribus (e.g., education), should not affect taste for work. 
 Further, the issue of the presence of fixed costs of working is raised by Apps and Rees 
(2009).  We only marginally control for fixed costs by including the presence of children in the 
determination of hours.  However, Heim (2009) presents results showing that once demographics 
are controlled for, additional consideration of fixed costs only very slightly impacts estimates of 
the parameters of the utility function (Heim, Table 3). 
 D. Use of a Synthetic Panel 
 The goal of this paper is to analyze the impact of the recession on changes in welfare 
through changes in market wages and non-labor income.  One possibility would be to use 
repeated (pre- and post-recession) observations on the same sample of families through the use 
of a long panel dataset in order  to observe how the recession affected wages, non-labor income, 
hours worked, and unemployment for each individual member of the household.  While the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) might seem an obvious candidate, as it provides a long 
panel of data, it doesn’t contain enough observations to produce reliable estimates across income 
groups.  In addition, the use of a panel data set would confound the welfare impact of changes in 
the labor market with other behavioral changes households went through during this period (i.e. 
changes in the household structure, parenthood, improving education, divorce rates, among 
others).  
Alternatively, the analysis in this paper makes use of a synthetic panel based on detailed 
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family characteristics, so that households in 2007 can be paired with similar households in 2011.  
The primary advantages of this approach are (1) we can make use of much larger cross-section 
data sets in order to improve estimation precision, and (2) we can isolate the impact of labor 
market changes from behavior or characteristic changes -- it's as close to a controlled experiment 
that we can get.  Details of how this synthetic panel is constructed are contained in the next 
section. 
III. Data 
 The American Community Survey (ACS) is a national random survey collected by the 
U.S. Census every year since 2000. The survey is sent to approximately 250,000 households 
every month. The ACS was designed to replace the decennial Census long form, and to be able 
to provide reliable demographic, housing, social, and economic data, for states and local areas, 
annually. From 2005, the ACS collects information for approximately 1% of the population, 
containing approximately 1.2 million household records.  
 A. Sample Creation 
 For the analysis in this paper, we use data from the 2007 American Community Survey 
(ACS) to estimate the pre-recession family utility function parameters used in the 
microsimulation, and data from 2011 to obtain a picture on labor market supply post-recession.12 
In order to estimate the joint household labor supply, the sample is restricted as follows: 
-­‐ Husband and wife present,  
-­‐ Husband and wife age between 25 and 64 years old,  
-­‐ Households with unmarried same- or opposite sex adults/partners are excluded, and 
-­‐ Households where the age of the oldest child living in the household is 30 yrs or younger. 
In order to broaden the applicability of the analysis, households with single house holders are 
                                                
12 The reference period of relevant labor market variables (Income from wages and hours of 
work) corresponds to the past 12 months. As such, data collected in 2007 (2011) could reflect 
labor market experience anywhere between January 2006 (2010) and November 2007 (2011). 
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also included in the sample (single household). The selection criteria for this sample are similar 
to above described, with the exception that the head of the household is single or not currently 
living with a spouse.  
 In addition, to reduce the noise from outliers in the sample, households with hourly 
wages at the top 0.5 percent and bottom 0.5 percent are excluded from the data, as well as 
households in the bottom three percent of the total income distribution. This leaves us with a 
total of 416,345 (384,456) married households and 243,792 (253,948) single households with 
single households for the 2007 (2011) sample.  
B. Simulation of the Great Recession 
 For reasons detailed in the previous section, we construct a synthetic panel, creating cells 
of families with the same characteristics in 2007 and 2011.  These cells are created based on 
detailed family characteristics that would not likely be affected by the recession itself.  The 
household groups or “cells” are defined using all possible combinations on the following 
characteristics: 
- 9 Census Divisions 
- Dummy for living in the Metro Area  
- If both husband and wife are present in the household (married or single household) 
- Sex of the head of the household (single households only) 
- Age combination of husband and wife (or single householder), using 5yr brackets 
- Number of children between 0 to 5yrs old (0, 1, or 2 or more) 
- Number of children 6yrs to 17yrs old (0, 1, 2, 3 or more) 
- If there is any child 18yr or older living in the household 
- Combinations of educational levels of Husband and Wife (Less than middle school, less 
than HS, High school, Some college, College, Grad school) (education level of single 
household) 
- Race of the married couple: 0 White couple, 1 Non-white couple, 2 Mix couple (white 
or non-white for single household). 
- Hispanic: If either the husband or wife is Hispanic. 
 
 Based on these characteristics, initially 183,000 household groups can be identified. For 
each identified cell with information available in 2007 and 2011, corresponding averages of 
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selected variables (hours of work, employment rate, non-labor income) in 2011 are calculated 
and assigned to the 2007 households. In cases where families in 2007 cannot be matched with 
similar 2011 families, based on the most detailed characteristics, rather than dropping the 
information of the "unmatched" family groups, we re-define the criteria for family groups using 
less restrictive information (e.g., excluding the “Hispanic” characterization, using dummies for 
presence of children in the household, combining certain education groups, etc).  The least 
restrictive criteria identify 2,002 unique family groups.  In turn, average cell information from 
2011 is assigned to the previously unpaired 2007 households groups based on the less restrictive 
grouping (e.g. an unmatched "Hispanic" family in 2007 would receive information from 2011 
families regardless of their "Hispanic" designation).   
 Table 1 presents information on the rate of cell matching for households in 2007.  From a 
total of 416,345 married households in 2007, 343,480 (82.5 percent) were paired using the most 
restrictive criteria. Only 107 households remain in groups that could not be matched even with 
the least restrictive cells. For single households, just over 99 percent of the sample was matched 
in the first round, with negligible number of observations being matched in later rounds. 
[Table 1 here]  
 Figure 2 illustrates hours of work cell averages, for 2007 families alone, compared to the 
actual data.  This gives us some idea about how accurate using cell averages for actual data will 
be.13  Figure 2 compares the distribution of actual hours worked in the previous year to the cell 
average hours worked, for couples and single households. The densities are estimated using 
                                                
13 The Cell averages could be thought as a nonlinear prediction of the number of hours worked, 
non-labor income, and employment rates, based on family characteristics.  The total number of 
hours worked last year is calculated using the declared "usual number of hours worked per 
week," and multiplied by the number of weeks worked last year. In the absence of wages per 
hour, this variable is estimated as the result of total salaried wage income earned last year, 
divided by estimated total number of hours worked last year. 
  
- 15 - 
household weights.  We see that cell averages do a better job reflecting actual hours for husbands 
than for wives, but are equally good adjusting hours for single men and women.  The cell 
averages clearly smooth through much of the clumping typically observed on integer values, but 
appear to replicate the actual distribution fairly well. 
[Figure 2 here] 
 Figures 3, 4 and 5 provide an overview of how the labor supply changed between 2007 
and 2011 (on average) across income deciles, based on pre-recession cell-average household 
income.  While the data indicate the effect of the recession was fairly consistent across the 
middle income groups, there is some heterogeneity on the impact of the recession for high and 
low income households. The figures show that employment of both husbands and wives 
uniformly declined from 2007 to 2011, except in the very lowest quintile.  Regarding hours of 
work, Figure 4 shows that husbands across most of the income groups seem to have been 
affected in a similar way, working fewer hours on average in 2011 than in 2007, except for the 
poorest households. A similar pattern is observed in Figure 5, for singles. Wives, on the other 
hand, consistently increased their hours of work between 2007 and 2011 across all income 
groups, especially in the low-income households.14 
[Figures 3, 4, and 5 here] 
 The synthetic panel is used to construct post-recession employment and hours outcomes 
for each person in the 2007 sample.  Changes in wages and non-labor income are calculated from 
an exogenous data source--the outgoing rotation groups from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS), 2006-2007 and 2010-2011. Based on the same synthetic panel principle, cells from the 
CPS data are defined based on sex, education level, and five-year age groups, as those are the 
                                                
14 While single men and women are combined in Figure 5, they are separated for purposes of 
estimating labor supply elasticities and utility function parameters. 
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principal factors that characterize wage profiles and wage growth. For each cell, average real 
wage growth is estimated, and assigned to each individual in the ACS 2007 sample. 
 Table 2 provides summary statistics comparing the probability of working and hours of 
work depicted in the figures above.  In addition, the average wages and non-labor income (in real 
$2007), as calculated from the CPS, are also reported.  Wages fell more for husbands than wives, 
but, overall, real wages fell roughly by one percent between 2007 and 2011.  Non-labor income 
fell more for married households (-14 percent) than for single households (-10 percent).15 
[Table 2 here] 
 
IV. Results 
 A. Utility Function Parameter Estimates and Labor Supply Elasticities 
 Utility function parameters are estimated separately for two types of households, married 
households, where both husband and wife are present, and for single households, where the 
householder is single or the spouse is not present.  Separate parameters are estimated for single 
male and single female households.  In order to take into consideration the heterogeneity across 
income groups (Hotchkiss et al 2012), the models are estimated across income deciles within 
each type of households.16  Maximum likelihood estimation results are presented in Appendix C. 
 Theoretically, labor is supplied to the extent that the marginal utility of leisure is equal to 
the market wage, suggesting that, within a family, if husbands are paid more than wives, 
                                                
15 It's of interest to note that stagnating aggregate real wages have been noted in several places 
(e.g., Mishel and Shierholz 2013), disaggregated wages, for example by education level, have 
actually shown a real decline, suggesting that any increases (or non-declines) in the aggregate are 
the result of shifting demographics, such as increasing educational attainment. 
16 This strategy was preferred instead of using a single income classification for both single and 
married households, as there was a larger concentration of single households within the low 
income groups, with a similarly large concentration of married households in upper income 
groups.  
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𝑈! > 𝑈!.  In addition, lower estimates of the marginal utilities of leisure would be consistent 
with greater values of labor supply, ceteris paribus.  As the additional utility gained from an 
additional dollar of income increases at a decreasing rate, we would expect 𝑈! (marginal utility 
of consumption) to be smaller for higher income families.   Figure 6 illustrates the estimated 
marginal utilities of leisure and income for families across income deciles, for married 
households and for single headed households.17 These figures show that the estimations of 
marginal utilities of leisure and consumption replicate the theoretical expectations for both 
married and single households. 
[Figure 6 here] 
 Figure 7 presents average wage and income elasticities for husbands (Panel a), wives 
(Panel b), single men (Panel c), and single women (Panel d).  Own wage elasticities for husbands 
and wives are averages across working and non-working spouses. Cross wage elasticities for 
husbands and wives correspond to families in which both members are working. Recall that 
linearizing the budget constraint (and denominator bias in the measurement of wages) can bias 
labor supply elasticities in a negative direction (Keane, 2010).  While this could explain the 
estimation of negative own wage hours elasticities for husbands in the lower end of the income 
distribution, these are not inconsistent with estimates reported by Kaiser et al (1992) for 
Germany; and Ransom (1987), MaCurdy et al. (1990), and Pecanvel (2002) using U.S. data.18  
[Figure 7 here] 
 Among all families, wives' own wages elasticities are much higher than husbands' 
elasticities, indicating that wives' labor supply is more responsive to changes in their own wages.  
                                                
17 For single households, the quintiles are defined based on the full sample, rather than the 
individual male/female headed household groups. 
18 Similar to Ransom (1987), while the uncompensated wage elasticity is negative albeit small, 
the corresponding compensated own wage elasticity for husbands is positive and around 0.2. 
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These estimates for wives' own labor supply elasticities are mostly within the range reported in 
the literature using U.S. data.19  The estimated negative cross-wage elasticities across all income 
levels indicate that husbands and wives view their leisure time as substitutes; this is consistent 
with cross-elasticities estimated by in Hotchkiss et al. (2012), Heim (2009), Ransom (1987).  
Both husbands and wives present the expected low and negative income elasticity, although 
wives are slightly more responsive to changes in non-labor income than their husbands.  
 With respect to single headed households, on average, the householders present a positive 
own wage elasticity, decreasing monotonically with income, as would be expected. The 
estimated income elasticity is also negative, as expected.  Also, as would be expected, labor 
supply elasticities of single men and women are more similar than elasticities of married men 
and women. 
 B. Estimated Welfare Impact 
 The accurate estimation of the welfare impact of the Great Recession depends on 
accurate estimates of optimal labor supply post-recession.  In order to assess the accuracy of 
those estimates we use the estimated model parameters to predict optimal pre-recession 
employment and hours of work and compare those predictions to the observed outcomes.  The 
details are contained in Appendix D, but the bottom line is that the model generally overstates 
employment probabilities and understates hours of work.  The implication of these two results is 
that labor supply elasticities will be under-estimated and, therefore, the change in family welfare 
reported here will be biased toward zero.  
 Figure 8 presents the change (mostly loss) in welfare experienced by families moving 
                                                
19 For example, the range of estimates found in Cogan (1981), Hausman (1981), Triest (1990), 
Ransom (1987), Hotchkiss et al. (1997), and Blau and Kahn (2005) is 0.12 to 0.97.  Also see 
Killingsworth (1983:107) and Hotchkiss et al. (2012). 
  
- 19 - 
from their optimal hours and consumption combination pre-recession to their predicted optimal 
combination post-recession, and finally to the actual outcome post-recession.20  These results 
take into account both the change in hours and consumption experienced on the intensive margin 
(on the budget constraint), as well as taking into account the change in probability of being 
employed in the two time periods.  The results for the lowest quintile indicate that after the 
recession, both single women and married families have marginally improved their welfare.21  
Two factors explain this. On the one hand, the utility loss from lower consumption that resulted 
from lower wages and fewer hours of work was partially compensated by a small increase in 
non-labor income among these households (see Table 3 discussed below). On the other hand, the 
marginal utility of leisure is large enough among first decile families that the utility gain from 
more leisure (fewer hours of work) helped to compensated for the utility loss from lower 
consumption. Both married and single families experienced increasing dollar-equivalent welfare 
losses as they moved up the income distribution. 
[Figure 8 here] 
   Note in Figure 8 that the greatest share of total welfare loss across deciles derived from 
the wage and non-labor income changes from pre- to post-recession (the dashed line).  On 
average, families only suffered relatively minor additional loss in welfare from constraints in the 
labor market (the difference between the dashed and solid lines).  This makes sense as everyone 
was subjected to (typically) declines in real wages and non-labor income.  But a relatively 
smaller portion of the labor force faced hours constraints (either through unemployment or 
working fewer hours than desired), making the average impact across all families smaller. 
                                                
20 Appendix A details the calculations and formulas used to calculate the change in family 
welfare between 2007 and 2011. 
21 Recall that when we are talking about the "lowest decile" this is post exclusion of families in 
the bottom three percent of the income distribution. 
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 The loss in welfare from the pre- to post-recession optimal hours/consumption 
combinations can be traced to the losses of real values in wages and non-labor income 
experienced by the average family in each decile, which are displayed in Table 3; these declines 
were larger among higher income families.  The small average gains in non-labor income among 
the lowest deciles might have resulted from transfer payments benefiting the poor. 
[Table 3 here] 
  Table 4 presents the welfare losses by household type across deciles as a percent of the 
decile's pre-recession total family income.  The figures produce a picture nearly identical (except 
in scaling) to that of Figure 8.  The greatest percentage loss accrued to married households in the 
top deciles, with single men and women generally experiencing greater percentage losses than 
married families, which is largely a function of their lower earnings and non-labor income.  In 
addition, single men in the top decile didn't suffer any additional welfare loss between their 
predicted and actual hours worked in 2011.  Single women in the lowest decile experienced the 
largest welfare gain as a percent of their pre-recession income, which is likely the result of the 
greatest opportunity for transfer payment being available to poor single women. 
[Table 4 here] 
 
V. Conclusions and Implications 
 The analysis in this paper illustrates that for any given family the dollar equivalent 
welfare loss across the Great Recession could have been significant, and that it varied greatly 
across family income deciles.  In fact, some of the lowest income families are estimated to have 
experienced a modest welfare gain across the recession, resulting primarily from smaller declines 
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in wages than experienced by families at the upper end of the income distribution, and from an 
average increase in non-labor income. 
 On average, across all deciles, married families suffered a welfare loss equivalent to 
roughly $3,000; single male household families suffered a welfare loss equivalent to about 
$1,400; and single female household families suffered a welfare loss equivalent to about $1,100.  
In 2007, there were approximately 56 million married couple households, 5 million single male 
headed households, and 14 million single female headed households (Kreider and Elliott 2009).  
This means the total welfare loss accruing to families in the U.S. from the recession amounts to 
roughly $190 billion.  To put this into perspective, total personal income in the U.S. in 2007 is 
estimated to have been about $11,900 billion (BEA 2007); the welfare loss amounts to 1.6 
percent of this total income.  Note, this is roughly in the same ballpark of the roughly two 
percent average welfare loss calculated as a percent of individual family pre-recession income 
seen in Table 4.  Of course, this is a static welfare loss and does not take into account losses 
incurred by families during 2008 and 2009, or any losses experienced from labor market 
transitions (e.g., Jacobson et al. 1993 and Sullivan and vonWachter 2009 ).  The estimate also 
doesn't directly account for policies undertaken to mitigate the impact of the recession, such as 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.  
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Figure 1. Indifference curve reflecting different pre- and post-recession scenarios 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of hours worked last year in family cell averages and in the actual data, 
2007 families. 
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Figure 3. Share of people who worked during the last year, 2007 and 2011 married family cell averages by income decile. 
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Figure 4. Total hours of work last year, workers only, 2007 and 2011 married family cell averages by income decile. 
 
Note: Information is restricted to people with positive number of hours worked last year. 
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Figure 5. Total hours of work last year, workers only, 2007 and 2011 single family cell averages by income decile. 
 
 
Note: Hours of work information is restricted to people with positive number of hours worked last year. 
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Figure 6. Estimated marginal utilities of leisure and income, by income deciles of total family income. 
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Figure 7. Own and Cross Wage Elasticities and Income Elasticities, by income decile 
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Figure 8. Simulated dollar-equivalent change in family welfare from pre-to post-recession by income deciles. 
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Table 1. Rates of matching 2007 family cells with 2011 families based on increasingly less restrictive criteria. 
  Single Men Single Women  Married Households 
Round Cumulative Match Criteria Adjustments #Households Share #Households Share #Households Share 
0 All criteria included 98,036 97.35 138,912 97.08 343,480 82.50 
1 Exclude Hispanic 685 0.68 1,619 1.13 13,032 3.13 
2 Use categories for number of children rather than actual number 1326 1.32 2,138 1.49 31,443 7.55 
3 Reduce number of education categories 294 0.29 185 0.13 3,677 0.88 
4 Additional reduction in number of education categories 140 0.14 81 0.06 620 0.15 
5 Reduction of age combination categories for married couples n/a  n/a  14,358 3.45 
6 Reduction in age categories overall 103 0.10 90 0.06 7,309 1.76 
7 Exclude indicator for children under five years 74 0.07 45 0.03 1,435 0.34 
8 Exclude metro/non-metro indicator 34 0.03 18 0.01 616 0.15 
9 Use Census Region rather than Census Division 5 0.00 1 0.00 268 0.06 
No  match  6 0.01 0 0.00 107 0.03 
Total number of Households 100,703      143,089      416,345  
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Table 2. Summary statistics, 2007 and matched 2011 family cell means. 
  2007  Cell Avg 
2011 Cell 
Avg 
Couples     
Husband working = 1 92.4% 90.4% 
Average total hours worked last year if working, husband 2197.6 2155.6 
Wife working = 1 75.5% 73.8% 
Average total hours worked last year if working, wife 1711.8 1745.7 
Husband hourly wage $29.6 $29.2 
Wife hourly wage $19.5 $19.3 
Annual Non-labor Income $10,837.0 $9,289.9 
Single Men 
  Working=1 87.2% 84.3% 
Average total hours worked last year if working 2059.8 2013.5 
Hourly Wage $22.6 $22.3 
Annual Non-labor Income $6,103.1 $5,438.0 
Single Women   
Working=1 84.7% 81.4% 
Average total hours worked last year if working 1855.2 1834.9 
Hourly Wage $18.8 $18.7 
Annual Non-labor Income $7,424.9 $6,716.2 
Notes: Non-labor income is deflated to 2007 dollars. Wages are estimated using the CPS real 
wage growth. Means are estimated using 2007 household weights. 
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Table 3. Changes in wages and family income from pre- to post-recession by deciles. 
 
 
 
 
 
Income 
Decile 
Married Households Single Men Single Women 
 
Average 
change in 
husband 
wage 
 (dw1) 
 
 
Average 
change in 
wife wage 
(dw2) 
 
Average 
change in 
family non-
labor income 
(dY) 
 
 
Average 
change 
in  wage 
(dw1) 
Average 
change in 
family non-
labor 
income 
(dY) 
 
 
Average 
change 
in  wage 
(dw1) 
Average 
change in 
family non-
labor 
income 
(dY) 
q1 -$0.22 -$0.18 $1,040.48 -$0.10 $169.7 -$0.18 $432.0 
q2 -$0.23 -$0.16 $500.46 -$0.10 $259.2 -$0.17 -$25.9 
q3 -$0.21 -$0.16 $224.59 -$0.16 -$342.7 -$0.13 -$109.0 
q4 -$0.29 -$0.20 $66.99 -$0.20 $150.9 -$0.12 -$550.8 
q5 -$0.35 -$0.18 -$388.06 -$0.24 -$96.0 -$0.05 -$211.2 
q6 -$0.39 -$0.20 -$887.13 -$0.38 -$576.5 -$0.13 -$793.5 
q7 -$0.45 -$0.16 -$1,622.11 -$0.37 -$746.6 -$0.24 -$739.5 
q8 -$0.51 -$0.19 -$1,755.05 -$0.55 -$1491.8 -$0.17 -$1257.0 
q9 -$0.54 -$0.19 -$3,607.33 -$0.56 -$1573.1 -$0.24 -$1652.6 
q10 -$0.44 -$0.19 -$9,204.22 -$0.34 -$2290.4 -$0.13 -$2466.5 
Note: Non-labor income and wages are deflated to 2007 dollars. 
  
- 35 - 
Table 4. Dollar equivalent change in welfare as a percent of pre-recession family income. 
 
 
 
 
Income 
Decile 
Married Households Single Men Single Women 
Change in 
welfare from 
2007 optimal 
hours to 2011 
optimal hours 
Change in 
welfare from 
2007 optimal 
hours to 2011 
actual hours 
Change in 
welfare from 
2007 optimal 
hours to 2011 
optimal hours 
Change in 
welfare from 
2007 optimal 
hours to 2011 
actual hours 
Change in 
welfare from 
2007 optimal 
hours to 2011 
optimal hours 
Change in 
welfare from 
2007 optimal 
hours to 2011 
actual hours 
q1 1.4% 0.2% 0.0% -0.6% 1.2% 1.1% 
q2 -0.2% -0.7% 0.2% -0.8% -1.3% -1.9% 
q3 -0.6% -1.0% -2.0% -2.7% -1.2% -1.7% 
q4 -1.1% -1.6% -0.6% -1.6% -2.5% -3.0% 
q5 -1.6% -2.0% -1.4% -2.2% -0.9% -1.5% 
q6 -2.1% -2.6% -2.9% -3.3% -2.7% -3.2% 
q7 -2.7% -2.9% -2.8% -3.1% -2.6% -3.3% 
q8 -2.6% -3.2% -4.2% -4.5% -3.0% -3.3% 
q9 -3.5% -3.8% -3.7% -3.8% -3.4% -3.6% 
q10 -5.3% -6.0% -3.1% -3.1% -3.5% -3.6% 
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Appendix A: Formulas for simulating change in family welfare under different scenarios. 
 In addition to changes interior to the budget constraint, we also want to take into account 
the changes to the probability of employment, which was significantly lower post-recession 
(higher unemployment). In order to do this, we make use of the implicit employment probability 
functions estimated in the model, which are used to estimate the extensive margin elasticities 
(how the probability of employment varies with wages and non-labor income) and the actual 
employment probabilities (𝑝! and 𝑝!) in the pre-recession period.  The employment probability 
functions are essentially the Tobit equivalent of the probability that hours of work are greater 
than zero.  Predicted changes in the employment probabilities can be estimated as: 𝑑𝑝! = !!!!!!  𝑑𝑤! + !!!!!!  𝑑𝑤! + !!!!"   𝑑𝑌     (A1) 𝑑𝑝! = !!!!!!  𝑑𝑤! + !!!!!!  𝑑𝑤! + !!!!"   𝑑𝑌  (A2) 
where, 𝑑𝑤! = 𝑤!!"## − 𝑤!!""#,  𝑑𝑤! = 𝑤!!"## − 𝑤!!""#, and 𝑑𝑌 = 𝑌!"## − 𝑌!""#. 
 The predicted optimal change in hours in 2011, given 2007 utility function parameters, 
changes in wages and change in non-labor income are calculated as follows: 
𝑑ℎ!∗ = !!,!""#!!!,!"##∗!    !!!!"! 𝑑𝑤! + !!!!"! 𝑑𝑤! + !!!!" 𝑑𝑌 + 𝑑𝑝! ℎ1,2007∗ +ℎ1,2011∗2     (A3) 𝑑ℎ!∗ = !!,!""#!!!,!"##∗!    !!!!"! 𝑑𝑤! + !!!!"! 𝑑𝑤! + !!!!" 𝑑𝑌 + 𝑑𝑝! ℎ2,2007∗ +ℎ2,2011∗2    (A4) 
All of these changes (e.g., in probabilities of employment and hours) will be calculated for the 
average decile cell.  Note that 𝑝!,!"##∗ = 𝑝!,!""# + 𝑑𝑝! and ℎ!,!"##∗ = ℎ!,!""#∗ + !!!!"! 𝑑𝑤! +!!!!"! 𝑑𝑤! + !!!!" 𝑑𝑌   for   𝑗 = 1,2. 
Similarly, the change on consumption will be calculated as: 𝑑𝐶∗ = 𝐶!"##∗ − 𝐶!""#, and  
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𝐶!""# = 𝑤!,!""#ℎ!,!""# + 𝑤!,!""#ℎ!,!""# + 𝑌!""# 𝐶!"## = 𝑤!,!"## ℎ!,!""# + 𝑑ℎ!∗ + 𝑤!,!"## ℎ!,!""# + 𝑑ℎ!∗ + 𝑌!"## 
 Comparisons between optimal utility-maximizing outcomes in 2007 and 2011 are then 
calculated as follows:: 𝑈!"##∗ − 𝑈!""#∗ = −𝑈!𝑑ℎ!∗ − 𝑈!𝑑ℎ!∗ +   𝑈!𝑑𝐶∗  (A5) 
 where, 𝑈! = −𝑎!∗ + 𝑏!!ℎ!∗ + 𝑏!"ℎ!∗ − 𝑏!"𝐶∗, (A6) 𝑈! = −𝑎!∗ + 𝑏!"ℎ!∗ + 𝑏!!ℎ!∗ − 𝑏!"𝐶∗, and (A7) 𝑈! = 𝑎!∗ + 𝑏!"ℎ!∗ + 𝑏!"ℎ!∗ − 𝑏!!𝐶∗;  (A8) 
and ℎ!∗ = !! ℎ!,!""#∗ + ℎ!,!"##∗ , ℎ!∗ = !! ℎ!,!""#∗ + ℎ!,!"##∗ , and 𝐶∗ = !! 𝐶!""#∗ + 𝐶!"##∗ . 
Note that the marginal utilities are calculated at the midpoint of hours and consumption, rather 
than at one point or the other.  
 Using the same formula, we can compare the predicted optimal utility outcome (𝑈!"##∗ ) 
with the suboptimal at observed (rather than predicted optimal) hours (note that 𝑑𝑌 here is the 
same at the 𝑑𝑌 above, so there is no contribution of the change in on-labor income to the 
comparison of optimal to suboptimal welfare outcomes): 𝑈!"## − 𝑈!"##∗ = −𝑈!𝑑ℎ! − 𝑈!𝑑ℎ! +   𝑈!𝑑𝐶  (A9) 
where, 𝑑𝐶 = 𝑤!,!"##𝑑ℎ! + 𝑤!,!"##𝑑ℎ!; 𝑑ℎ! = ℎ!,!"## − ℎ!,!"##∗ , and  𝑑ℎ! = ℎ!,!"## − ℎ!,!"##∗ ; 𝑈! = −𝑎!∗ + 𝑏!!ℎ! + 𝑏!"ℎ! − 𝑏!"𝐶; (A10) 𝑈! = −𝑎!∗ + 𝑏!"ℎ! + 𝑏!!ℎ! − 𝑏!"𝐶; (A11) 
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𝑈! = 𝑎!∗ + 𝑏!"ℎ! + 𝑏!"ℎ! − 𝑏!!𝐶; and (A12) ℎ! = !! ℎ!,!"## + ℎ!,!"##∗ , ℎ! = !! ℎ!,!"## + ℎ!,!"##∗ , and 𝐶 = !! 𝐶!"## + 𝐶!"##∗ . 
Note that the marginal utilities are calculated at the average between the optimal and suboptimal 
hours and consumption, rather than at one point or the other.  A simpler alternative would be to 
just use the 2011 suboptimal hours and consumption values. 
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Appendix B: First order conditions of utility maximization problem, labor supply 
equations, and likelihood function estimated. 
 
 The quadratic functional form as presented in equation (5) in the text can also be written 
in the following form: 
𝑈 𝑍 = 𝑎! 𝐿! + 𝑎! 𝐿! + 𝑎! 𝐶 − !! 𝑏!! 𝐿! ! − !! 𝑏!! 𝐿! ! − !! 𝑏!! 𝐶 ! − 𝑏!"𝐿!𝐿! − 𝑏!"𝐿!𝐶 − 𝑏!"𝐿!𝐶 (B1) 
Where 𝐿! = 𝑇 − ℎ!; 𝐿! = 𝑇 − ℎ!;𝑎𝑛𝑑,𝐶 = 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑌 
This becomes an unconstrained utility maximization problem which depends on the working 
hours ℎ! and ℎ!, assuming that Y (non-labor income) is exogenous.  The corresponding first 
order conditions become: 
!"!!! = 𝑎!∗ + 𝑎!∗𝑤! − 𝑏!!ℎ! − 𝑏!!𝑤! 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑌 − 𝑏!"ℎ! + 𝑏!" 2𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑌 + 𝑏!"𝑤!ℎ! = 0 (B2) 
!"!!! = 𝑎!∗ + 𝑎!∗𝑤! − 𝑏!!ℎ! − 𝑏!!𝑤! 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑌 − 𝑏!"ℎ! + 𝑏!" 𝑤!ℎ! + 2𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑌 + 𝑏!"𝑤!ℎ! = 0 (B3) 
There is no need to specify a time endowment (T) in order to estimate the labor supply functions 
because 𝑎!∗, 𝑎!∗ , and 𝑎!∗  are re-parameterized functions of T and Y.  This re-parameterization is 
necessary for identification of the labor supply equations.  It is through these starred parameters 
that differences in tastes across families are allowed to enter.  Specifically, 𝑎!∗ = 𝑋!Γ!  and 𝑎!∗ = 𝑋!Γ! 
where 𝑋! and 𝑋! are vectors of individual and family characteristics and Γ! and Γ! are parameters 
to be estimated. 
 Using equations (B2) and (B3), we can solve the system obtaining the values of ℎ! and ℎ! that maximize the utility function, in the following way: Ω!ℎ!∗ + Ω!ℎ!∗ + Ω! = 0 (B4) Ω!ℎ!∗ + Ω!ℎ!∗ + Ω! = 0 (B5) 
Where: 
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 Ω! = 2𝑏!"𝑤! − 𝑏!! − 𝑏!!𝑤!!; (B6) Ω! = 𝑏!"𝑤! + 𝑏!!𝑤!𝑤! − 𝑏!" + 𝑏!"𝑤!; (B7) Ω! = 𝑎∗! + 𝑎∗!𝑤! + 𝑏!!𝑤! + 𝑏!" 𝑌; (B8) Ω! = 2𝑏!"𝑤! − 𝑏!! − 𝑏!!𝑤!!;   and (B9) Ω! = 𝑎∗! + 𝑎∗!𝑤! + 𝑏!!𝑤! + 𝑏!" 𝑌. (B10) 
From equations (B4) and (B5), the solutions for ℎ!∗ and ℎ!∗  become: ℎ!∗ = !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!  (B11) ℎ!∗ = !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!  (B12) 
Observed hours (ℎ), however, can differ from optimum hours due to stochastic errors, such that: ℎ! = ℎ!∗ + 𝑒!          𝑖𝑓  ℎ!∗ + 𝑒! > 00                                  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  (B13) ℎ! = ℎ!∗ + 𝑒!          𝑖𝑓  ℎ!∗ + 𝑒! > 00                                  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  , (B14) 
where we assume that 𝑒!, 𝑒!  follows a bivariate normal distribution with mean 0 and 
covariance Σ. This model can be considered a simultaneous Tobit model, where both variables 
are censored from below. 
 In order to calculate the new optimal hours (post-recession, see equation 4 in the text), we 
require expressions for the partial derivatives of the labor supply equations (equations B11 and 
B12) with respect to 𝑤!, 𝑤!, and Y.  These functions are differentiated accordingly, with the help 
of Mathematica® (Wolfram Research, version 8).  Since we specify a censored error distribution 
through estimation of a bivariate Tobit, the derivatives and hour predictions are adjusted 
following Muthen (1990), and then evaluated for each family.  Only the averaged elasticity 
values are presented. 
 - B3 - 
 For the case of single headed households, the corresponding quadratic utility form can be 
simplified to: 
𝑈 𝑍 = 𝑎! 𝐿! + 𝑎! 𝐶 − !! 𝑏!! 𝐿! ! − !! 𝑏!! 𝐶 ! − 𝑏!"𝐿!𝐶       (B15) 
Where 𝐿! = 𝑇 − ℎ!;   𝑎𝑛𝑑,𝐶 = 𝑤! ∗ ℎ! + 𝑌 
In this case, the first order condition corresponding to the single household case becomes: 
!"!!! = 𝑎!∗ + 𝑎!∗𝑤! − 𝑏!!ℎ! − 𝑏!!𝑤! 𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑌 + 𝑏!" 2𝑤!ℎ! + 𝑌 = 0     (B16) 
In this case, the optimal hour supply can be directly obtain from solving equation (B16): 
ℎ!∗ = !!∗!!!∗!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!           (B17) 
Finally, since observed hours (ℎ) can differ from optimum hours due to stochastic errors, the 
corresponding model becomes: ℎ! = ℎ!∗ + 𝑒!          𝑖𝑓  ℎ!∗ + 𝑒! > 00                                  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  (B18) 
Which can be estimated as a non-linear tobit model, that are censored from below. 
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Appendix C: Maximum likelihood estimation results and dollar equivalent welfare changes as a function of pre-recession total income. 
 
Table C.1. Maximum likelihood parameter estimates. 
Panel (a): Married Family Households 
  
Full 
Sample Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
a1: Husband                       
Age 136.02* 164.13* 116.09* 133.75* 123.99* 151.28* 162.82* 162.71* 151.43* 164.25* 130.95* 
 
(3.40) (12.36) (10.52) (12.57) (10.42) (10.26) (8.88) (9.61) (8.69) (9.39) (8.81) 
Age^2 -172.55* -227.24* -161.15* -176.51* -162.47* -195.56* -206.78* -203.11* -186.56* -198.48* -159.07* 
 
(4.19) (14.16) (12.34) (15.83) (13.11) (12.66) (10.64) (11.32) (9.76) (10.34) (9.32) 
Sex (Male=1) 176.27* 244.10* 99.82* (15.980) 74.15+ (50.510) (70.440) (6.060) (83.620) (151.980) (62.940) 
 
(9.76) (33.37) (31.97) (33.88) (35.76) (44.87) (52.71) (60.87) (61.12) (109.91) (117.28) 
Education (base=LTH)            
High School 246.92* 328.60* 123.74* (16.250) 78.11+ (54.530) (77.190) (43.640) 117.80+ (138.530) (23.700) 
 
(11.17) (47.80) (37.74) (36.77) (38.31) (45.37) (53.51) (60.43) (58.74) (108.40) (112.96) 
Some College 339.88* 420.20* 132.39* (18.940) 95.20+ 96.61^ (89.810) (29.740) (94.140) (163.180) (40.180) 
 
(13.54) (61.83) (48.34) (44.18) (42.28) (49.81) (54.87) (62.85) (58.52) (107.66) (110.36) 
College 495.10* 555.85* (146.020) (40.590) (27.200) (109.240) (104.970) (2.820) 153.31+ (72.200) (123.340) 
 
(18.46) (131.60) (97.14) (73.67) (64.72) (70.57) (65.22) (69.09) (61.25) (109.07) (110.61) 
Grad 
           
 
-235.30* -304.58* -194.62* -194.90* -144.40* -80.92+ -137.30* -86.05* -69.77+ -97.25* -92.04+ 
Race (base=White) (9.57) (47.51) (36.85) (35.07) (31.12) (32.67) (34.10) (28.93) (32.21) (36.17) (37.69) 
Black -118.42* 121.10+ (66.710) (26.320) (35.310) (10.790) -74.28+ -128.61* -100.69* -100.40* (32.190) 
 
(10.63) (61.09) (54.25) (48.15) (41.17) (41.18) (33.88) (30.65) (24.64) (25.18) (23.03) 
Other -19.60* 221.56* 85.68* (7.740) (28.130) (0.970) (31.130) (39.440) (18.290) (13.990) (35.030) 
 
(7.41) (33.04) (30.63) (29.89) (27.57) (27.82) (26.85) (26.88) (25.82) (30.14) (29.80) 
Hispanic 88.12* 120.89* 175.76* 195.20* 140.83* 65.00+ (29.590) 53.81+ 40.96* 48.53* 25.24+ 
 
(9.59) (23.33) (25.44) (31.72) (30.62) (26.01) (21.50) (20.92) (15.82) (14.73) (11.19) 
#Children 0-5 42.42* (5.200) 46.51* 62.38* 51.65+ 39.04* (17.270) 28.82+ (9.540) 20.63^ (12.860) 
 
(5.97) (17.88) (18.03) (19.66) (20.08) (14.35) (13.79) (14.02) (10.92) (10.91) (8.18) 
#Children 6-12 56.44* 53.61+ 111.47* 72.13* 46.25* 45.78* 33.54* 61.19* 56.08* 40.44* 59.14* 
 
(4.15) (22.51) (19.55) (17.31) (14.91) (14.15) (12.09) (11.33) (9.99) (9.63) (8.56) 
#Children 13-17 -1047.21* -1833.50* -1041.42* -1064.75* -793.00* -964.68* -1179.06* -1079.70* -1022.50* -999.36* -541.41+ 
  (52.37) (257.12) (213.41) (203.72) (175.53) (173.81) (170.12) (188.53) (189.88) (229.49) (232.88) 
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Full 
Sample Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
 
a2 :Wife                       
Age 46.28* 56.36* 55.53* 39.03* 35.95* 66.57* 66.53* 48.60* 60.03* 55.54* 33.66* 
 
(1.85) (11.25) (9.61) (10.09) (8.64) (8.05) (8.25) (6.27) (6.16) (6.08) (4.61) 
Age^2 -63.20* -81.49* -82.36* -59.61* -56.44* -92.79* -92.54* -65.54* -77.23* -72.66* -46.05* 
 
(2.24) (13.19) (11.53) (13.06) (11.01) (10.48) (10.62) (7.76) (7.34) (7.22) (5.25) 
Sex (Male=1) 211.79* 240.33* 264.48* 206.90* 141.21* 137.16* (18.890) 80.28^ (68.760) (14.680) (50.460) 
 
(9.26) (34.78) (37.51) (45.45) (37.48) (45.41) (47.92) (45.30) (47.43) (70.25) (48.29) 
Education (base=LTH) 
           High School 289.74* 383.81* 368.93* 274.70* 235.25* 189.55* (62.450) 87.16^ 111.89+ (28.980) (33.020) 
 
(10.87) (47.02) (42.49) (48.78) (39.02) (46.16) (48.12) (44.91) (46.77) (69.21) (46.39) 
Some College 344.14* 309.42* 316.15* 307.35* 267.28* 272.07* 141.72* 140.21* 133.05* (68.800) (44.490) 
 
(12.46) (56.06) (46.87) (53.87) (41.25) (48.45) (48.96) (45.29) (46.71) (68.86) (45.41) 
College 498.18* 271.32+ 274.51* 425.46* 242.39* 341.41* 234.82* 259.64* 238.39* 220.44* 173.74* 
 
(16.94) (111.32) (94.79) (75.12) (50.11) (56.33) (53.90) (48.30) (49.19) (70.62) (46.52) 
Grad 152.80* 163.52* 166.58* 310.44* 224.73* 204.13* 220.00* 180.14* 166.60* 203.26* 200.48* 
 
(10.20) (40.35) (37.79) (37.52) (29.11) (27.68) (29.72) (21.87) (22.91) (22.52) (21.50) 
Race (base=White) 
           Black -87.18* (74.480) (69.380) (75.620) -161.44* -150.38* -167.08* -115.26* -64.22* (22.750) (13.930) 
 
(7.85) (50.09) (49.25) (47.52) (35.42) (30.99) (29.05) (20.74) (15.93) (15.21) (11.23) 
Other -38.79* -180.20* -59.70^ -55.79^ -50.81+ (23.610) (9.670) (25.520) 90.05* 111.66* 61.53* 
 
(6.40) (33.24) (31.31) (32.17) (24.80) (24.58) (22.57) (19.16) (17.87) (19.08) (14.37) 
Hispanic -313.04* -410.00* -497.39* -492.58* -403.87* -369.83* -367.10* -293.60* -254.97* -249.78* -192.15* 
 
(12.31) (33.53) (31.48) (26.98) (26.86) (24.09) (25.18) (20.21) (18.15) (17.70) (12.51) 
#Children 0-5 -169.52* -144.59* -220.03* -211.62* -212.40* -164.23* -197.82* -157.12* -158.87* -177.49* -134.96* 
 
(7.24) (18.23) (18.93) (17.23) (16.63) (13.39) (15.69) (12.26) (11.96) (12.82) (8.86) 
#Children 6-12 -62.06* (30.250) -50.56* -56.11* -46.83* -81.73* -49.96* -46.12* -63.02* -76.02* -64.78* 
 
(4.49) (19.71) (19.53) (17.57) (13.16) (12.24) (11.01) (8.73) (8.31) (7.85) (6.03) 
#Children 13-17 -767.00* -2139.21* -1612.34* -893.23* -630.59* -971.19* -697.01* -687.50* -926.14* -720.68* -384.53* 
 
(39.48) (245.92) (199.53) (174.94) (143.34) (125.67) (126.91) (110.55) (123.46) (131.84) (105.31) 
a3 33.35* 287.80* 193.07* 116.29* 83.84* 69.33* 56.55* 37.84* 28.47* 19.09* 12.85* 
 
(0.71) (10.91) (6.36) (5.26) (3.41) (2.84) (2.46) (1.67) (1.41) (0.94) (0.66) 
b12 -0.32* -0.59* -0.67* -0.66* -0.50* -0.36* -0.29* -0.29* -0.23* -0.21* -0.14* 
 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
b13 -.005* -.028* -.018* -.014* -.0098* -.0089* -.0069* -.0059* -.0041* -.0034* -.0019* 
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Full 
Sample Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
 
(0.0001) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
b22 0.62* 0.95* 1.04* 1.01* 0.81* 0.73* 0.70* 0.53* 0.47* 0.43* 0.34* 
 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
b23 -.0031* -0.00046 -.0045* -.0046* -.0036* -.0032* -.0032* -.0027* -.0022* -.0021* -.0012* 
 
(0.0001) (0.0016) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
b33 .000032* .0037* .0015* .00065* .00038* .00031* .0002* .000086* .000046* .000013* 2.8e-06* 
 
(0.000002) (0.000180) (0.000078) (0.000061) (0.000030) (0.000021) (0.000013) (0.000007) (0.000004) (0.000002) (0.000001) 
drho -0.17* -0.12* -0.22* -0.27* -0.23* -0.09^ -0.06 -0.12* -0.08* -0.11* -0.04+ 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
s1 852.46* 901.18* 876.86* 845.04* 821.95* 803.71* 799.11* 793.91* 780.05* 774.53* 780.43* 
 
(1.69) (6.21) (5.78) (5.76) (5.44) (4.97) (4.99) (4.99) (4.73) (4.67) (4.56) 
s2 1107.79* 1296.91* 1160.69* 1096.43* 1051.98* 1022.44* 1010.48* 1026.30* 1038.43* 1050.13* 1105.06* 
  (2.13) (7.79) (6.91) (6.31) (6.15) (5.59) (5.57) (5.49) (5.44) (5.33) (5.47) 
LL -5.237E+08 -4.678E+07 -4.996E+07 -5.164E+07 -5.275E+07 -5.309E+07 -5.354E+07 -5.337E+07 -5.382E+07 -5.310E+07 -5.297E+07 
N 400803 35594 39483 40520 40380 40698 41026 40941 40565 40233 41146 
Standard errors in parentheses 
          ^ p<0.1, + p<0.05, * p<0.01 
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Panel (b): Single Men. 
 
Full 
Sample Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
a1 
           Age 144.48* -38.20 -3.82 109.01* 78.06* 166.13* 167.56* 134.30* 192.29* 135.33* 148.08* 
 
(9.53) (71.26) (51.79) (27.54) (23.52) (34.80) (37.83) (28.22) (24.72) (24.17) (27.58) 
Age^2 -220.04* -22.78 -57.83 -190.60* -149.63* -248.38* -255.00* -201.94* -250.13* -186.27* -202.12* 
 
(11.72) (81.02) (59.05) (34.40) (27.96) (40.38) (47.31) (34.39) (29.49) (27.01) (29.80) 
Married  563.26* 1009.43+ 181.30 612.56* 512.20* 859.34* 499.58+ 456.98* 312.62* 236.34* 516.82* 
(Spouse absent) (63.73) (481.91) (178.83) (224.34) (153.86) (240.98) (225.31) (143.06) (102.97) (80.12) (95.77) 
Education (base=LTH) 
           High School 510.11* -77.19 458.71+ 354.48+ 69.96 -160.02 -65.95 -322.08 -200.91 374.75 266.54 
 
(44.08) (280.59) (187.91) (171.34) (155.13) (291.81) (401.28) (265.56) (379.43) (436.88) (467.66) 
Some College 706.30* -245.73 537.75+ 567.38* 51.16 -177.64 295.13 -437.68^ -262.88 494.28 661.64^ 
 
(51.99) (491.12) (253.85) (206.99) (156.25) (304.83) (392.83) (263.25) (390.85) (428.40) (348.83) 
College 1076.30* 887.14 447.72 448.76 308.25 404.19 495.47 -294.28 -308.73 4.99 93.92 
 
(76.23) (1034.73) (442.57) (297.31) (198.59) (326.73) (407.72) (252.17) (375.90) (415.90) (269.83) 
Grad 1544.81* -2907.40 -465.20 -220.44 -257.89 -868.67 572.34 -45.13 -102.80 169.54 299.32 
 
(121.90) (2147.43) (1061.87) (818.30) (396.17) (539.70) (545.99) (277.12) (372.25) (418.43) (266.90) 
Race (base=White) 
           Black -401.04* 211.85 -602.95* -463.00* -307.00* 80.87 -200.81 -236.86* 22.52 -55.11 -279.12* 
 
(39.68) (264.90) (199.10) (139.18) (103.07) (177.25) (139.15) (91.47) (82.91) (80.60) (103.00) 
Other -308.07* -10.15 -486.51^ -108.42 -179.56 -0.90 -386.54^ -86.74 -166.19+ -14.94 20.66 
 
(58.48) (412.47) (275.39) (179.03) (159.71) (281.75) (201.92) (125.29) (73.87) (92.24) (100.60) 
Hispanic 180.10* 961.54+ 539.01* -10.28 175.72 121.00 353.64+ 85.70 -64.04 -163.97^ 84.66 
 
(39.00) (402.40) (181.80) (125.52) (120.71) (148.33) (164.32) (88.83) (75.41) (86.57) (109.49) 
#Children 0-5 63.64 184.25 177.78 207.97 192.05 -450.74+ 163.23 274.79^ 105.04 -108.94 -44.30 
 
(66.46) (308.47) (246.83) (177.67) (197.90) (219.56) (198.96) (146.28) (116.67) (121.27) (180.32) 
#Children 6-12 57.41 240.00 25.78 113.45 -39.30 383.35 72.63 152.24^ 24.37 58.26 151.99+ 
 
(43.89) (315.78) (186.25) (127.52) (106.24) (246.53) (132.42) (88.85) (54.49) (72.53) (63.39) 
#Children 13-17 330.99* 171.86 543.66+ 514.21+ 332.03+ 284.15 382.02+ 354.98* 163.55+ 141.58+ 208.99* 
 
(51.39) (365.31) (277.04) (202.09) (145.21) (189.90) (157.43) (99.73) (66.56) (67.61) (72.53) 
_cons -1522.66* -1695.72 -218.17 -1437.46+ -149.96 -1253.93 -1030.78 150.58 -1393.13+ 19.06 -415.96 
  (202.48) (1692.51) (1102.17) (594.88) (499.99) (839.37) (848.59) (579.54) (555.15) (672.37) (661.98) 
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a2 280.78* 1504.80* 781.61* 478.15* 302.06* 352.85* 279.41* 154.56* 75.63* 69.35* 64.70* 
 
(24.94) (543.59) (189.15) (102.78) (44.74) (87.64) (71.63) (32.54) (20.98) (8.28) (6.55) 
b12 -.056* -.2^ -.1+ -.063+ -.038* -.066* -.06* -.033* -.014* -.018* -.017* 
 
(0.006) (0.120) (0.045) (0.026) (0.011) (0.022) (0.018) (0.008) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
b22 .00026* .013* .0053* .0029* .0015* .00088* .0003* .00017* .00009* 0.000 -.000044* 
 
(0.00003) (0.00210) (0.00048) (0.00026) (0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00009) (0.00004) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
s1 931.52* 916.60* 890.32* 924.52* 931.21* 920.66* 903.62* 910.78* 890.02* 837.94* 859.86* 
  (5.36) (18.54) (15.05) (14.15) (12.76) (14.48) (12.63) (10.98) (14.54) (9.81) (10.03) 
ll -7.97E+07 -4.84E+06 -6.94E+06 -7.93E+06 -8.65E+06 -8.67E+06 -8.40E+06 -8.44E+06 -8.57E+06 -8.59E+06 -8.22E+06 
N 97,808 7,061 8,573 10,542 10,281 10,320 10,403 10,189 10,249 10,265 9,925 
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Panel (c): Single Women. 
 
Full 
Sample Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
a1 
           Age 153.02* 53.37 30.65 109.90* 116.79* 145.63* 93.34* 86.05* 144.69* 135.24* 205.06* 
 
(7.28) (52.19) (37.65) (31.38) (25.80) (24.90) (18.30) (15.76) (18.40) (19.40) (18.73) 
Age^2 -208.58* -124.53+ -91.90+ -180.25* -184.85* -203.89* -144.04* -130.76* -199.59* -179.49* -250.74* 
 
(8.50) (60.57) (43.15) (35.92) (30.07) (28.94) (21.12) (18.39) (20.33) (21.59) (20.10) 
Married (Spouse absent) -103.21* -93.52 119.71 33.08 -567.96* -209.71 -353.41* -117.69 -132.74 -75.14 5.42 
 
(39.56) (278.62) (206.13) (189.14) (175.41) (153.61) (122.18) (100.50) (100.37) (72.75) (85.51) 
Education (base=LTH) 
           High School 602.02* 770.14* 297.70+ 610.78* 277.41 261.22^ 93.09 287.21 -70.35 -43.19 364.32 
 
(31.32) (192.75) (146.89) (181.18) (177.55) (158.05) (217.19) (184.59) (246.04) (240.75) (355.24) 
Some College 791.92* 1019.09* 562.57* 694.34* 181.48 285.09^ 118.06 191.37 -64.01 -62.95 365.69 
 
(36.12) (271.45) (179.89) (190.86) (179.07) (156.11) (212.63) (180.89) (240.87) (231.04) (327.44) 
College 1127.03* 1160.60* 698.30* 405.12^ 336.71 528.23* 179.79 284.14 -116.69 -206.97 408.11 
 
(48.15) (435.91) (249.26) (236.71) (209.31) (171.67) (211.36) (179.85) (239.43) (228.48) (309.88) 
Grad 1548.77* 1457.09 831.94 868.22^ 508.99^ 567.91+ 367.76 439.31+ -3.00 -114.77 561.51^ 
 
(70.06) (1067.11) (642.74) (523.24) (279.35) (236.85) (231.44) (188.38) (243.75) (229.61) (309.39) 
Race (base=White) 
           Black -167.36* 241.60^ -97.18 -3.98 -68.32 27.53 82.69 60.05 -98.99 44.53 -50.07 
 
(19.46) (143.95) (104.29) (99.09) (76.71) (71.34) (60.09) (47.09) (63.82) (48.70) (56.92) 
Other -62.70 657.30+ -42.56 -38.37 -25.87 445.24+ -30.65 133.96^ 2.33 27.80 140.78^ 
 
(38.18) (265.49) (203.22) (181.23) (239.72) (182.33) (121.98) (81.08) (79.56) (62.11) (83.31) 
Hispanic 179.04* 905.85* 618.03* 431.79* 375.61* 259.53+ 186.09+ 178.55* -23.52 12.14 240.82* 
 
(26.61) (224.13) (149.51) (137.97) (118.41) (102.20) (82.70) (63.97) (76.89) (70.46) (77.66) 
#Children 0-5 -211.56* -240.55+ -80.60 -33.40 -180.97+ -222.28+ -226.39* -275.82* -184.38+ -249.97* -166.17+ 
 
(20.38) (109.32) (110.70) (107.93) (88.07) (90.91) (75.21) (83.85) (91.30) (85.61) (71.59) 
#Children 6-12 -111.37* 101.97 -54.93 83.95 -47.57 -11.24 -100.83+ -104.89* -234.70* -255.79* -176.43* 
 
(13.03) (80.17) (64.11) (77.64) (73.28) (51.34) (40.50) (35.25) (40.98) (39.89) (35.69) 
#Children 13-17 31.27+ 499.96* 417.65* 298.84* 243.71* 66.00 81.05^ 20.81 -51.31 -0.25 -69.23+ 
 
(15.25) (129.70) (91.98) (77.77) (70.44) (52.50) (43.61) (36.84) (38.90) (32.35) (29.52) 
_cons -2290.39* -2983.99* -693.46 -1652.95+ -972.28^ -1568.96* -15.34 209.92 -463.39 -262.58 -2342.57* 
  (159.75) (1145.00) (825.77) (700.46) (551.13) (534.14) (420.88) (370.07) (462.21) (470.91) (510.76) 
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a2 210.84* 1395.23* 770.94* 499.68* 332.18* 242.70* 175.45* 108.26* 102.33* 55.28* 49.86* 
 
(11.17) (181.39) (91.36) (50.37) (34.48) (35.88) (19.16) (9.92) (9.00) (7.35) (4.68) 
b12 -.04* -.24* -.14* -.1* -.065* -.048* -.035* -.022* -.021* -.011* -.013* 
 
(0.003) (0.049) (0.025) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
b22 .00049* .018* .0046* .002* .0011* .00065* .00046* .00032* .00023* .00014* -0.00001 
 
(0.00003) (0.00190) (0.00045) (0.00032) (0.00018) (0.00012) (0.00009) (0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00003) (0.00001) 
s1 923.08* 958.51* 927.76* 947.21* 924.75* 907.18* 868.54* 859.59* 850.53* 843.91* 828.95* 
  (3.33) (10.84) (10.55) (10.76) (11.22) (10.14) (9.49) (9.02) (8.76) (8.91) (8.22) 
ll -1.04E+08 -1.04E+07 -1.01E+07 -9.50E+06 -9.46E+06 -9.79E+06 -1.04E+07 -1.07E+07 -1.07E+07 -1.09E+07 -1.10E+07 
N 136,621 14,252 13,146 13,326 12,391 12,887 13,913 13,769 14,170 14,222 14,545 
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Appendix D: Assessment of Model Goodness-of-fit. 
 The purpose of this appendix is to assess the goodness of fit of the estimated utility 
model.  This is done by using the estimated model parameters to predict optimal pre-recession 
employment and hours of work and then those predictions are compared to the actual observed 
outcomes.   
 Figure D1, Panels (a)-(c) compare the actual distribution of annual hours of work 
(individual and synthetic cell averages) with predicted hours of work at the individual level 
(Model Prediction), for Husbands (Panel a), Wives (Panel b), and Singles (Panel c).  The 
distribution of predicted hours matches fairly closely the distribution of cell average hours, 
which serves as the benchmark for the modeling of work hours. 
[Figure D1 here] 
 Table D1 shows that even though the distribution of predicted and actual cell average 
hours match well, at the mean predicted hours are underestimated.  In addition, the average 
probability of employment is overestimated.  The implications of this under- and overestimation 
can be seen by referring to the equations in Appendix A.  Since the prediction of the probability 
of employment in 2011 is overestimated, the change in the probability given any wage change 
(e.g., !!!!!!  ) is underestimated due to the nonlinearity of the probability cumulative distribution 
function, and the fact that employment probabilities are in the upper tail of the function.  This 
can be seen in the graphical illustration of Figure D2; for a given change in Z, the change in P is 
smaller at higher values of P. 
[Figure D2 here] 
 As can be seen in equations (A3) and (A4) in Appendix A, an understatement in 𝑑𝑝! and 𝑝!,!"##∗  (J=1,2) will contribute to an understatement of the predicted optimal change in hours.  In 
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addition, the understatement of optimal predicted hours (among workers) implies that the change 
in hours is also understated (as the labor supply equations are linear).  Both of these results imply 
that 𝑑ℎ!∗ and 𝑑ℎ!∗  (equations A3 and A4 in Appendix A) are potentially biased toward zero.  
This, in turn, implies a potential underestimation of the welfare loss calculated in equations (A5) 
and (A9).  In other words, from a purely goodness-of-fit perspective, the loss in family welfare 
estimated in this paper should be considered a lower bound.  Any estimated welfare gain should 
also be considered a lower bound. 
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Figure D1. Actual (individual and cell averages) and predicted hours of work for those who are working. 
 
Panel (a): Husbands Panel (b): Wives  
 
Panel (c): Single Men Panel (d): Single Women 
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Figure D2. Illustration of how the change in P is smaller at higher values of P. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table D1. Actual and predicted hours (among workers) and employment probabilities. 
 Married Households Single Single 
 
Husband Wife Men Women 
Actual Employment Rate 92.4% 75.5% 87.1% 84.7% 
Predicted Employment rate 98.2% 82.6% 93.0% 92.3% 
   
  
Actual Hours work if working 2197.6 1711.8 2059.8 1855.2 
Predicted Hours work 2076.1 1551.4 1965.6 1742.5 
 
 
 
